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CALL OUT THE MINUTEMEN
Where have all the Minutemen gone? The term "Minutemen" hearkens back to the American Revolution and those militiamen who, at a minute's notice, were armed and prepared to fight the British Regulars. "Minutemen were a small, hand-picked elite force which was required to be highly mobile and able to assemble quickly. Minutemen were selected from militia muster rolls by their commanding officers." 1 Where are the Minutemen today? I would argue that they no longer exist. Today, Reserve Component forces are on the front lines in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Unlike their active duty counterpart, they are not structured or resourced to respond rapidly in the event of a crisis. Unless the Reserve Components can transform the way they do business and adopt a more expeditionary mindset, it is likely that they will become less and less relevant to the Total Force. Maybe it is time to resurrect the Minuteman system?
REASONS TO TRANSFORM
In order to fully appreciate the requirement for change in the Reserve Components, it is necessary to view the overall condition of the Army. Anyone who watches the news knows that the Army is stretched to the limit. The Army was authorized more than 700,000 troops at the end of Desert Storm; after the war, the Army's end strength was reduced to 480,000. While the Army's force structure has since remained constant, the operating tempo has increased significantly. In fact, the worldwide requirement for Army forces has increased significantly in just the last three years. For example, in July 2000, the Army had over 140,000 soldiers deployed; today we have over 368,000 soldiers deployed around the world, a 150% increase in mission without a commensurate increase in end strength. In addition to the multiple mobilizations noted above, some reserve units were mobilized and then poorly utilized. Some 2,000 reservists spent more than a year on alert status without ever deploying, while other reservists were held on active duty beyond their call-up dates, due to administrative errors. 13 Still other reservists were mobilized four months before Iraq and then told they weren't needed. 14 This type of unnecessary disruption causes anxiety and resentment among the soldiers, their families, and their employers. The repercussions of these sentiments are likely to be felt well into the future.
Recruiting and retention are two areas where problems are expected to arise due to the high mobilization rates. In FY03, the Army Reserve fell short of its reenlistment goals. At the same time, the National Guard fell 13% short of its recruiting goal. 15 A recent National Guard survey indicates that long deployments could cause an increased attrition rate, with 20-25% of these soldiers leaving the military per year. 16 The good news is that the recruiting shortfalls in the Guard were offset by higher than average retention rates. The bad news is that some of this increased retention may be due to the recent "stop loss" which keeps soldiers from leaving the service. In fact, many experts believe that the Army National Guard 21 Therefore, a greater number of problems are being faced by those least able to cope with them.
Even without these problems, reservists are having growing concerns about the security of their jobs upon demobilization. Under the law, reservists cannot be fired due to mobilizations. In fact, they are guaranteed the same status, seniority, and rate of pay when they return to work. 22 The reality is that this law is difficult to enforce completely. According to the Boston Globe, recent deployments are so long that some reservists are losing their jobs. 23 During deployments, corporate restructuring, mergers, and other normal business practices sometimes eliminate jobs that reservists left behind. A recent survey by Goldman Sachs showed that nearly one third of deployed reservists questioned whether, or not their jobs would be waiting for them when they came off active duty; over half of these believed that, as a minimum, there would be a negative effect on pay and promotion. 24 America is also asking employers to bear an unusual burden with the current level of reserve mobilizations. One of the most difficult burdens on employers is multiple mobilization of the same people. 25 In addition to multiple mobilizations, unplanned extensions on active duty have also effected employers. Small business employers and small local governmental organizations have been affected the most by the extension of their employees on active duty.
To put the problem in perspective, about 50% of Reserve Component soldiers work for companies with fewer than 1,000 employees, while 15% work for companies with fewer than 50 employees. 26 Those reservists who are entrepreneurs sometimes bear the greatest burden.
The current level of operations has placed a strain on the Army, particularly the Reserves.
This strain indicates that there may be an imbalance between what is required of the force and the current capability of the force. One method to address this imbalance would be to lessen the requirement by reducing the operating tempo for our Armed Forces. Although this option sounds attractive, the reality is that we cannot disengage from our worldwide commitments.
Even if we do not take on any additional operational commitments, our current level of activity is projected to remain relatively stable for sometime. For example, the situation in Afghanistan continues to be tenuous as there have been recent signs that Al -Qaeda is reorganizing and conducting more extensive operations in the region. If the United States is going to fulfill its global security commitments reducing operating tempo is not a valid option.
INCREASING CAPABILILTY
Therefore, the Army needs to increase its overall capability. Various alternatives to increasing the capability of the force have been proposed recently. These proposals center around two basic approaches: increasing active duty end strength, or restructuring the active and reserve components to increase the forces available for deployment and lessen our reliance on the reserves. Both of these options are currently being explored. In addition, increasing end strength is not a good mechanism to fulfill temporary requirements. Once force structure is added, both political and military leaders feel pressure to utilize the military in order to justify the existing force structure. These same leaders are hesitant to cut these forces once they are no longer required, especially during election years.
Finally, increasing permanent end strength without a commensurate increase in appropriations could leave the army "bloated and ill-prepared" according to the Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker. 31 If, as Secretary Rumsfeld has stated publicly, the increased demand on the Army represents only a temporary spike, then it would make more sense to temporarily utilize the Reserve Components to meet this surge in requirements in addition to other measures already being used such as Stop Loss.
The other approach to increasing capability is to restructure the active and reserve components. This approach has support in both the legislature and the administration.
Recently, House Majority Leader Roy Blunt (R-Mo) called for a full review of the structure of the U.S. Armed Forces, expressing concern about the frequent use of the reserves. 32 The
Secretary of Defense has also called for a rebalancing of the force mix to reduce our reliance on the reserve components, especially in high demand fields like civil affairs. He has also directed the services to limit involuntary call-ups within the first 15 days of a crisis. Table 4 ). The Ramp-up Units, previously designated as National Ready Brigades (NRB), would then be designated as NDBs. These units would have to undergo their annual training and deployment processing prior to mobilization; however, this process would occur more quickly due to their greater level of readiness,. The units which were lower on the tiered readiness cycle, listed as National Ready Brigades, would then undergo a compression of training and readiness phases to provide greater depth in any future rotation cycles. These units could also be mobilized, although they would require a longer lead time than the Expeditionary, or Ramp-up units. Units in the Reset Phase would not change their disposition, or readiness levels unless absolutely necessary. However, in the event of a major war, all units could be mobilized. Of course, they would do so at varying mobilization timelines, with lower numbered NRBs being activated first. integrating the MINUTE MEN units into the Global Basing Initiative, the Army would be able to reduce the number of family members currently in these countries, as well as the infrastructure requirements and corresponding overseas basing costs.
ExpeditionaryRamp-up Company Platoon
The utility of the MINUTEMAN system could be maximized by applying it to other elements of the Reserve Components such as high demand units like military police and civil affairs. By converting existing force structure to these low density, high demand specialties, the Army Reserve could establish a rotational system for battalion and smaller sized, critical units.
These units would be placed on the same five year cycle as the ESBs. Through this restructuring, the proposed MINUTEMAN system would satisfy Lieutenant General Helmly's intent of a 10 to 1 ratio of capability to need so that a soldier deploys only once in five years. 37 The success of the MINUTEMEN system is tied to gaining support from the Congress.
Some elements of Congress are skeptical about the current growing reliance upon the reserves.
Senator James Inhofe , the Republican Senator from Oklahoma, recently stated that current operating tempo was causing the Army to overwork the Guard and Reserve.
time they can be obligated to go overseas and how many times they have to go overseas. 39 The MINUTEMEN system addresses both of these concerns by adding predictability to the mobilization and deployment process.
Another prerequisite for the MINUTEMEN system to be successful is to address the There is no reason to believe that this improvement in readiness will not continue given the ongoing command emphasis and the provision of sufficient resources.
As stated above, the MINUTEMEN system addresses the primary concerns of Congress and the requirements of Homeland Defense. By keeping the Reserve components in the fight and addressing the issues of predictability and readiness, the MINUTEMEN system could be used to fulfill the short term capability shortfalls in a cost-effective and innovative manner. In order to make the MINUTEMEN force a reality, the Army would have to address key force development issues. Additionally, the MINUTEMEN system will require significant changes in
Reserve Component Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, and Facilities to make the system work.
IMPLEMENTING THE MINUTEMAN CONCEPT
Mobilization doctrine is the first area where changes will have to be made. The rationale for our current mobilization concept was well expressed in a recent AUSA Defense Report . In addition to the establishment of Integrated Divisions, the Army must also restructure the force to create rotational depth in the high demand, low density units. Under the Federal
Reserve Restructuring Initiative, the reserves are already in the process of restructuring to provide more military police, civil affairs, and other high demand units. 43 For example, the National Guard is already creating depth in the bench by converting over 5,000 artillery soldiers into military police. 44 By creating this additional depth, the Army can reduce the number of involuntary call-ups. In order to gain an expeditionary capability similar to the ESBs, the
Reserves may want to establish modular capability packages, such as the stabilization units being proposed by Retired Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski. 45 The Reserve Components must also change the way they train if the MINUTEMEN system is to be successful. Table   5 ). In addition to increasing training time and flexibility, the Army may also want to narrow the breadth of missions for which each reserve unit trains. Currently, many Reserve components are required to train for missions they will never execute. By narrowing the mission essential task list (METL) to most probable tasks, precious collective training time could be devoted to more frequently required, critical tasks and provide the Joint Force Commander a more relevant and ready force.
RAMP-UP EXPEDITIONARY RESET
60-80 days incl.
Annual Training
Train/Alert/Deploy In addition to changes in training and readiness responsibilities, the Army must also increase the percentage of active soldiers in the Guard and Reserves in order to increase readiness. These full time support personnel are critical to the readiness of Guard and Reserve units. As Lieutenant General Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, pointed out in a recent AUSA Landpower Essay, "under current guidelines it can take several weeks to months to prepare an Army National Guard unit to mobilize and deploy -compared to the Air Guard model, where units deploy in a matter of hours, or days." 47 The primary difference between these two models is the number of full time support personnel. The Air National Guard is manned with 33.67% full-time personnel. 48 The Army National Guard and Army Reserve are manned at 11.3% and 6.8% respectively (see Figure 1) . According to the most recent National
Guard Bureau Posture Statement, the Army has developed an "incremental ramping method"
for achieving Reserve Component full-time strength levels. However, they will not get there until 2012. 49 The Army Reserve Components would need a more rapid increase in the number of full time support personnel to meet the increased readiness requirements of the MINUTEMEN system.
FIGURE 1: FULL TIME MANNING COMPARISON 50
The MINUTEMAN system would also have to utilize a personnel policy that provided minimal turnover for units going into the Ramp-up and Expeditionary Phases. The unit manning system being adopted by the active component has only minimal application in the reserves.
The reserves would have to address this turnover through enlistment and reenlistment incentives synchronized with the operational readiness cycles. Recruiting efforts would have to increase during the Company training phase to ensure that the unit was set prior to entering the Ramp-up Phase. Additionally, reenlistments options would have to stabilize career soldiers through the Expeditionary phase, or transfer them to other, lower priority units.
The MINUTEMAN system would also require a self mobilization capability in the reserves.
Increasing full time strength would address the personnel requirements for self mobilization;
however, there would have to be a corresponding improvement in facilities. 
